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Launched in 2004 by the EU, the ENP was conceived as a foreign policy tool 
to deal with countries and regions bordering the EU after its enlargement 
phases. This policy represented a major shift in the EU’s approach toward the 
region, before which cooperation was primarily technical. Overall, the ENP 
has reflected two main peculiarities embodied in the EU’s external action: a lib-
eral impetus, according to which the promotion of democratic principles, eco-
nomic development and prosperity are likely to bring about improved stability, 
and a regional-oriented modus operandi based on the belief that both a regional 
approach and the promotion of regional coordination among actors are likely 
to better answer key objectives and potential challenges ahead. Ultimately, both 
features would positively impact the EU’s security.
Although based on a general commitment to promote democracy and human 
rights, the ENP has worked primarily on economic relations and opportunities, 
including issues related to the labour market and visa facilitation. Moreover, the 
value attached to maintaining stability at its periphery has not impeded the EU 
in coming to terms with authoritarian regimes on its southern and eastern bor-
ders, something which contradicts the values it allegedly supports in this body 
of policies. Lacking the card of partnership and recognizing the relevance of the 
neighbourhood for its own stability and security, the EU has found it difficult 
to induce a major commitment to democracy and foster respect for human 
rights. The aim to bring neighbours’ economic and legislative structures in line 
with those of the Union has been backed by opportunities regarding politi-
cal association, deeper economic integration, increased mobility and improved 
people-to-people contacts. The EU has thus forged bilateral approaches with 
countries at its periphery in addition to regional dimensions covering its south-
ern and eastern border, like the EaP that was launched in 2009 and based on 
a Swedish and Polish initiative. Although not directly bordering the EU, the 
Southern Caucasus has been encompassed by this effort, both at the bilateral 
and regional levels, something which has been encouraged by the geoeconomic 
and geostrategic importance of this ‘sub-region’.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate how the ENP has performed in rela-
tion to the Southern Caucasus, which approaches have been followed, which 
goals have been delineated, which achievements have been reached, and which 
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shortcomings have surfaced and for which reasons. As an empirical assessment 
of the ENP’s overall implementation and performance, the chapter attempts 
to highlight the apparent and increasing inefficacy of the EU’s policies, whose 
weakening bargaining power and lack of a comprehensive regional strategy 
are backfiring in its attempt to promote both stability and development in the 
eastern neighbourhood. Besides taking into consideration the structural weak-
nesses of the EU’s projection toward the Southern Caucasus, the chapter will 
focus on various sub-regional and supra-regional factors that hinders a consist-
ent implementation of the ENP.
EU eastward projection: the ENP and the EaP
The roots and the ratio of the neighbourhood policy are to be found in the 
EU resolve to avoid creating new dividing lines in Europe and to exploit the 
opportunities provided by the enlargement to develop a more coherent and 
durable basis for relations with neighbours. This resolve was defined on the 
eve of the 2004‘big bang enlargement’ (Patten and Solana 2002, p. 1). Targeted 
towards countries not benefiting from the perspective of membership, the ENP 
was conceived as a foreign policy tool aimed at developing a zone of prosperity 
and a friendly neighbourhood that would foster close, peaceful and cooperative 
relations (European Commission 2003, p. 4). Moreover, when it set the goals of 
the forthcoming proximity initiative, the European Commission highlighted its 
relevance to the duty to ensure social cohesion and economic dynamism, which 
depended upon the EU’s approach toward member states as well as toward 
present and future neighbours (European Commission 2003, p. 3). As such, the 
ENP stood as a key tool for Brussels to continue the decades-long European 
integration process even beyond its enlargement policy.
In the document setting the basis of the neighbourhood policy, the commis-
sion further specified that ‘over the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s 
capacity to provide security, stability and sustainable development to its citizens 
will no longer be distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with 
the neighbours’(European Commission 2003, p. 3). This statement implied that 
overall European stability was largely related to development beyond its bor-
ders. Therefore, policy coordination with neighbouring countries had come 
to constitute a significant portion of the EU’s external action. The concept 
of ‘indivisibility of security’ between the EU and its neighbourhood, hereby 
affirmed, was fully in line with the rationale of the simultaneously drafted 
European Security Strategy (ESS), ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, which 
was approved in December 2003. Indeed, the ESS valued the goal of ‘Building 
Security in the Neighbourhood’ as one of the three pillars upon which the 
EU should have based the defence of its security and promotion of its values 
(European Council 2003, pp. 7–8).1The link between the two processes is so 
strong that some scholars suggested that the ENP could indeed be regarded as 
the ‘operationalization’ of the aforementioned objective, ‘translating the holis-
tic approach to foreign policy advocated by the ESS into a concrete policy 
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framework for relations with the Union’s periphery’ (Biscop 2010, p. 73). An 
explicit linkage was thus put forward between good governance in neighbour-
ing countries and EU security and between the extension of the benefits of 
the political-economic cooperation beyond EU borders and the preservation of 
security within them. Therefore, the ENP framework was conceived as a way to 
prevent spillover into the EU of security threats originating in the neighbour-
hood such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional 
conflicts, state failure and organized crime. Far from being a mere proximity 
initiative, the ENP was a relevant component of the effort undertaken by the 
EU. This effort aimed to define the very essence and contours of its external 
projection while safeguarding the achievements of the European project itself. 
It was, therefore, a key tool for continuing the integration project while pro-
tecting it from external threats.2
Against this background, the EU’s attitude towards bordering countries can 
be seen as following two main theoretical approaches. The first approach, which 
is of a liberal nature, emphasizes the positive contribution of the promotion of 
interdependence and improved contacts between countries for increased pros-
perity and stability. According to this first tenet, potential tensions would be 
solved by the provision of incentives and opportunities resulting from the har-
monization of legislation from third countries and the undertaking of structural 
economic reforms. Moreover, these provisions would incite development and 
possible prosperity. Finally, more stable neighbours would benefit the Union by 
diluting potential sources of tension. The second approach, reflecting both lib-
eral and constructivist traits, has insisted on ‘regionalism’ and the positive effects 
that regional approaches would bring about in coordination attempts. Accord-
ing to the neo-functionalist logic (Haas 1968), regionalism reflects a peculiar 
trait of the EU integration process that is liable to be replicated in other geo-
graphical contexts. In fact, the ENP document emphasizes, “The EU must act 
to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration that are 
preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction 
of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment” (European Com-
mission 2003, p. 3). Furthermore, the efforts aimed at enticing regional coor-
dination and at promoting patterns of regional integration seem to follow the 
logic of the RSC theory of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003). According 
to this theory, because the transnational character of most challenges ahead is 
likely to create security interdependencies among states in a region due to the 
fact that “most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long 
ones” (p. 4), attempts at regional coordination are better suited to more effec-
tively address potential risks. If the RSC theory holds true, regions bordering 
or close to Europe are potential sources of challenges for the Union. This ulti-
mately requires forms of inter-regional coordination:
Closer geographical proximity means the enlarged EU and the new neigh-
bourhood will have an equal stake in furthering efforts to promote trans-
national flows of trade and investment as well as even more important 
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shared interests in working together to tackle trans-boundary threats – 
from terrorism to air-borne pollution.
(European Commission 2003, p. 4)
At the time of its drafting, the ENP did not include the Southern Cauca-
sus republics in its original scope, ostensibly because of geographical realities.3 
However, a decision was made to appoint a special representative to the region 
in 2003.4 Such a choice directly contradicts both the letter and the ratio of the 
ESS as well as its draft version, which was submitted by High Representative 
for the CFSP Javier Solana at the June 2003 Thessaloniki European Council 
meeting.5 Indeed, addressing the need to build security beyond its borders, the 
ESS explicitly called on the EU to ‘take a stronger and more active interest in 
the problems of the Southern Caucasus’, an area that was bound to become a 
neighbouring region (European Council 2003, p. 8). Along with the ordinary 
institutional dialogue characterizing the decision-making process, this incon-
gruity in positions seems to reflect what Dov Lynch labelled the proximity-
distance paradox affecting the region, a paradox that still recurs from time to time 
in the vision of the EU and its member states. Accordingly, while the Caucasus 
is close enough to force the EU to consider its interests in promoting regional sta-
bility, it is at the same time distant enough that regional threats are not perceived 
as immediate (Lynch 2003, p. 178). The subsequent inclusion of the Caucasus in 
the ENP – recommend by the Commission to the Council in May 2004 – was 
propelled more by local developments rather than by a sound EU initiative. In 
fact, it mainly resulted from ‘windows of opportunities’ for regional engage-
ment opened up by the November 2003 ‘Rose revolution’ in Georgia and 
from the contested presidential elections in Armenia (February-March 2003) 
and Azerbaijan (October 2003), which sounded as wake-up calls for the EU. 
Simultaneously, the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus republics into the ENP 
framework stood as a recognition of the growing role the region was coming to 
play for EU energy security policies in terms of the production and transporta-
tion of hydrocarbons (European Commission 2004, p. 11), on the backdrop of 
the first energy disputes between RF and its Eastern European transit states.6
Basically, the ENP represented a value-driven initiative7 aimed at stimulating 
political transformation in the neighbourhood. It was based upon three main 
instruments though which international actors may ignite democratization 
processes: contagion, convergence and conditionality (Kubicek 2003, pp. 5–7). Con-
tagion occurs when events in one country – or the effects of demonstrations of 
outside actors – spread across borders if they are seen as attractive or achievable. 
The reference is to a potential ‘democratic wave’ that could have been initiated 
both outside (i.e. Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries) or inside (i.e. 
Georgia or Ukraine) the ENP geographical scope. Sharing with contagion the 
nature of ‘passive leverage’ (Vachudova 2005), convergence refers to the gradual 
movement toward system conformity through the growth of transnational net-
works. Linking benefits to the fulfilment of certain requirements, conditionality 
works according to a cost/benefit logic and represents the key ‘active leverage’ 
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available to the EU, employing ‘carrots and sticks’ to persuade, induce or coerce 
interlocutors into adopting its desired policy. However, the main ‘carrot’ – i.e. “the 
chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, 
economic and cultural co-operation” (European Commission 2004, p. 3) – 
proved to be flawed and not attractive enough to achieve the expected results. 
Moreover, although the ‘stake in the internal market’ carrot may have been 
attractive to partners, the inflexibility of engagement tools has been criticized 
on the grounds of advancing a ‘take-it-or-leave’ perspective, reflecting EU 
interests more than those of its partners. Acknowledging the shortcomings of a 
that the ENP approach ‘has not always been successful in providing incentives 
further reforms in the partner countries’ (European Commission 2015a, p. 4), 
the 2015 ENP Review, following extensive consultation with the stakeholders, 
stressed the need to focus relations with neighbours ‘more clearly on com-
monly identified shared interests’ (European Commission 2015b, p. 5).While 
this approach signalled a major departure from the ‘one-size-fits-all’ rationale, it 
did not account for a downgrade of the ENP’s value-driven nature, nor of the 
aforementioned linkage between the enhancement of internal security and the 
external promotion of universal values.8
In 2009, the aims of tackling ENP shortcomings and of emphasizing the 
regional dimension of the neighbourhood policy resulted in the framing of the 
EU EaP, which encompassed the three Caucasian republics along with Belarus, 
Moldova and Ukraine. The new framework for cooperation was launched in 
the aftermath of, and as a response to, the August 2008 Russo-Georgian War 
in South Ossetia, which highlighted the enduring instability of the region and 
the heightened risk of spillover that the conflict posed to the EU. Therefore, 
the EaP confirmed once again the reactive nature of EU projection toward the 
Southern Caucasus, already highlighted at the time of its inclusion in the ENP.
Aimed at fostering political association and economic integration between 
the EU and its eastern partners, the EaP stood, in Brussels’ view, as a real ‘step 
change’ in their relations. Indeed, the framework introduced some new features 
to the previous regional approach. By offering a functional and sector-based 
type of cooperation, the EaP appeared to be a much more pragmatic frame-
work, advancing an interest-driven approach capable of leading to a gradual 
de-politicization of cooperation which, in turn, would overcome divisions cre-
ated by the democracy promotion approach (Penkova 2013, p. 27). Against this 
backdrop, the EaP was shaped by a bilateral and a multilateral track. While the 
latter provides a ‘thematic platform’ to jointly address common challenges,9 
the bilateral track aims instead at fostering political and economic engage-
ment through the negotiation of AA and the establishment of DCFTA that 
allow integration into the EU market. Moreover, the EaP promotes a greater 
mobility of citizens through bilateral agreements aimed at MP, visa facilita-
tion, readmission and visa liberalization.10 Finally, a key feature of EaP is an 
attempt to complement the traditional top-down approach to transformation 
with the advancement of bottom-up processes involving civil societies. Moreo-
ver, the step change in relations brought by the EaP did not merely result from 
15037-0174d-1pass-r02.indd   275 18-08-2017   22:56:29
276 Carlo Frappi
the wider scope of the framework. It resulted, simultaneously, from the leading 
stabilization role de facto undertaken by the EU following the war in South 
Ossetia,11 on the backdrop of partial U.S. retreat from the region under the 
Obama administration (Dueck 2015, p. 67).
To date, the major successes of EU regional cooperation schemes have been 
achieved in relations with Georgia. An AA including a DCFTA was signed 
between the parties in June 2014 and entered into full force in June 2016. 
Moreover, a European Council regulation on visa liberalization to the Schen-
gen area for Georgian citizens came into force in March 2017.
From principles to actions: structural weaknesses  
of EU’s Southern Caucasus policies
More than a decade after the launch of the first regional initiative toward the 
Caucasus and notwithstanding a growing economic interdependence,12 the EU 
frameworks for cooperation did not bear the expected fruits, neither in terms 
of regional stabilization nor in terms of security. Moreover, it also exhibited a 
degree of failure as a normative power due to the lack of substantial progress in 
the regional democratization processes as well as in the spread of EU values and 
norms. Such weakness seems to have been the consequence of a series of inter-
related factors. Although some of these factors descend from regional and sub-
regional obstacles to the EU project, the project itself was plagued by inherent 
inconsistencies and contradictions that hampered the wider attempt to reach 
out to neighbours with a sound formula for cooperation and engagement.
The basic deficiency of EU policies descends directly from its premises. 
The ENP and the EaP were conceived around the logic of providing partners 
with ‘everything but institutions’ – i.e. offering neighbours alleged economic 
and political benefits in exchange for their reception of the democratic norms 
and governance standards of the EU. So conceived, the neighbourhood policy 
could have been a useful tool for the EU to solve the ‘exclusion-inclusion 
dilemma’, but it fell short in addressing partners’ long-term expectations. The 
 ‘enlargement-lite’ hereby put forward (Popescu and Wilson 2009) ended up 
creating both ambiguity in the EU approach and discontent among partner 
countries (Penkova 2013, p. 22), especially those, like Georgia, that openly pur-
sued the goal of membership. The gap between EU offers and partners’ expecta-
tions emerged, for example, in the wording of the November 2013 EaP Vilnius 
Summit Joint Declaration. Contrary to expectations (Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty 2013a), the Declaration lacked a reference to Article 49 of the 
Lisbon Treaty, which allows any European State respecting EU fundamental 
values to apply for membership. While acknowledging European aspirations, 
the Declaration downgraded expectations by labelling EaP participants as mere 
‘partner countries’. Moreover, the ‘watering down’ of the Vilnius Declaration 
was basically the result of the vision of the influential member states – like Ger-
many or France – objecting future enlargements, in opposition to the vision of 
 others – like Poland or Sweden – that instead favoured a sounder EU regional 
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engagement. This could only affect the overall coherence and credibility of 
the EU, along with the efficacy of its cooperation schemes. In fact, the gap in 
geographic priorities among member states resulted in an inadequate political 
and economic support to the ENP and EaP, deprived from sufficient financial 
commitment (Paul 2016, p. 3).
In reaching out to its eastern neighbours, the EU has mainly followed the 
same logic that has been applied to the CEE countries in the framework of 
the enlargement policy. However, since it offers these neighbors no options for 
membership and inadequate economic support, commitment to reforms and 
to European values has been at best lukewarm and has at times been perceived 
as an unwanted interference in internal affairs. Essentially, because the ENP was 
an alternative to membership and not a preparatory tool to that goal, the main 
source of EU external leverage – i.e. conditionality – proved to be scarcely 
credible and largely ineffective in promoting normative alignment with the 
South Caucasian countries.
Lacking a clear membership offer as well as a sound incentive scheme, the 
ENP, particularly after the 2015 Revision, has been based mainly on the logic 
of differentiation, relating participation in the framework and depth of coopera-
tion to single partners’ adherence to its values. This logic of differentiation and 
the resolve to strengthen positive conditionality led to the introduction of the 
so-called more-for-more principle. Institutionalized by the 2011 ENP Review 
(European Commission 2011, p. 10), the principle is based on a ‘joint owner-
ship’ ratio, which emphasizes the bilateral vector of relations between the EU 
and partner countries as embodied in the Action Plans negotiation process.13 
The other side of the coin shall apply a ‘less for less’ principle intended as a 
sanction for those neighbours ‘making insufficient efforts to build a deep and 
sustainable democracy and to undertake the agreed upon reforms’ (European 
Parliament 2013). However, by introducing a degree of bilateral bargaining 
between the parties, the joint ownership ratio represented an additional factor 
that undermined the strength of the conditionality due to the weakening of 
the asymmetrical bargaining power once enjoyed by the EU vis-à-vis pro-
spective members. This consideration, potentially resulting in a ‘more for less’ 
practice, is particularly true where interest in bilateral cooperation exceeds the 
value-driven agenda. This squeezes the EU between the attempt to effectively 
implement its higher aims of democratization and the promotion of good gov-
ernance on the one hand and the search for more pragmatic gains on the other. 
The relevance of the Southern Caucasus area – and particularly Azerbaijan – 
for advancing EU drive toward diversification of energy supply channels is a 
good example of the weakening of regional bargaining power. The growing 
relevance of Azerbaijan to Brussels’ energy supply strategy allowed Baku to 
pursue a cooperation à la carte, based upon the promotion of sectorial interde-
pendence with the EU and its member states along the SGC and, simultane-
ously, upon the refusal of unwelcome inherencies in domestic affairs, especially 
in the absence of a sounder regional political commitment on EU side. There-
fore, the joint ownership principle may contrast with the ‘meritocracy’, which, 
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along with ‘asymmetric interdependence’ and ‘enforcement capability’, repre-
sented one of the key characteristics ensuring the effectiveness of conditionality 
in the pre-accession process (Vachudova 2005, p. 4).
The joint ownership principle, besides weakening the EU’s leverage vis-à-
vis Eastern partners, highlights the lack of a consistent regional strategy, which 
affects the overall coherence, and hence credibility, of the EU’s projection 
toward the Southern Caucasus. The need to take into account the sometimes 
contradictory visions and needs of its partners drove the EU to embrace some 
visible paradox. For example, the EU simultaneously endorsed the principle of 
“self-determination of peoples” and the principle of “territorial integrity and 
inviolability of internationally recognised borders” in the ENP Action Plans 
signed in 2006 with Armenia and Azerbaijan, respectively.14
Yet, besides the progressive loss of the asymmetrical bargaining power caused 
by ‘conditionality-lite’ or ‘negotiated conditionality’ (Sasse 2008; Nikolov 
2007),another key distinction marks the different power of attraction currently 
exerted on eastern partners when compared to the one enjoyed vis-à-vis CEE 
countries. Indeed, the strong identity appeal which accompanied successive EU 
enlargement rounds to CEE countries and strengthened its normative power 
could not work in the same way in the Southern Caucasus (or eastern neigh-
bourhood). The ‘return to Europe’ course, which represented a key stimulus 
for reform in the CEE countries (Dunay 2004, p. 35), was at best flawed in the 
Caucasus. With the partial exception of Georgia (see Müller 2011, pp. 64–92), 
the self-perception of the Caucasian actors is much more nuanced. In addition 
to historical and cultural factors that influence and differentiate the views of 
both CEE and Caucasus countries,15 the lack of self-identification with Europe 
among the latter seems to have also pragmatic motivations. Indeed, against the 
backdrop of the overlap between nation and state building processes, the progres-
sive entrapment of regional actors – in the Caucasus as well as in the wider 
post-Soviet space – in a dichotomous east-west logic made self-representation 
a highly politicized issue.16 Such a trend has been reinforced by the growing 
strategic polarization and fragmentation of the area, which, as a matter of fact, 
stands as the key external factor hampering EU regional projection and efficacy.
Tackling the Caucasus puzzle: the flawed  
EU geopolitical approach
The Southern Caucasus could be portrayed as a ‘broken region’, as the EU 
special representative for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby, did in referring 
to its multiple identity (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2007). Southern 
Caucasus republics’ relations with the EU clearly reflect and testify the differ-
ent priorities and strategic orientations of the three countries. While Georgia, 
eager to walk the path of Euro-Atlantic integration, has been the most active 
in catching the opportunities provided by EU regional projection, Armenia, 
on the contrary, has progressively downgraded the level of commitment to and 
cooperation with European initiatives, subordinating it to the cooperation e 
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with Russia and to the integration into the Moscow-led regional initiatives. 
Somewhere in the middle, Azerbaijan has instead pursued flexible alignments 
and non-binding cooperation with all the international players active in the 
area, consistently with a multi-vectorial and balanced course of foreign policy.
The main feature of the region is a deep and creeping infighting that 
exploded in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR in a series of ethno-
territorial conflicts and was protracted over time due to the failure of the bel-
ligerents to sign peace agreements. Besides representing an open challenge to 
the post-bipolar international order, the persistence of de facto statehoods in 
South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh affects regional reality on 
three interconnected levels. First and foremost, the unfulfilled state building 
processes in Georgia and Azerbaijan and the ongoing Armenian occupation 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent districts stand as an apparently insur-
mountable obstacle to the full integration of the Caucasian republics into Euro-
Atlantic cooperation mechanisms. Secondly, the situation on the ground fosters 
the strategic polarization of the area, thereby preventing the development of 
institutional cooperation. It is no coincidence that – with the exception of the 
poorly institutionalized BSEC organization – the Southern Caucasus lacks any 
inclusive regional cooperation mechanism capable of overcoming the divisions 
generated and crystallized by the so-called protracted conflicts. Thirdly, the 
‘permanent conflict status’ prevailing in the Caucasus maintains and strength-
ens over time Russian regional hegemony. Since the signing of the ceasefire 
agreements, Moscow has been both a fundamental guarantor of the survival of 
the breakaway self-proclaimed republics as well as a key mediator in respective 
peace processes. Against this backdrop, EU regional policies have been severely 
weakened by the lack of a sound security dimension capable of tackling the 
protracted conflicts and balancing Russian regional leverage.
Even before the eruption of the Ukrainian crisis, the pivotal role played by 
Russia in the Caucasus in both strategic and economic terms emerged as the 
key challenge to EU regional projection. The lack of cooperation and policy 
coordination in the ‘shared neighbourhood’ resulted in an inevitable and increas-
ing competition for influence between an increasingly ambitious European pol-
icy and the assertive ‘near abroad’ policy that emerged in post-Yeltsin Russia.17 
Although apparently unintentionally (see Cornell 2014, p. 180–183), the EU, in 
the aftermath of the Russo-Georgian War and the launch of the EaP, ended up 
being entangled in a geopolitical confrontation with Moscow. Indeed, the latter 
came to perceive EU regional projection through the lenses of its ‘perpetual geo-
politics’ (Kotkin 2016), namely through the need of protecting its own sphere of 
influence against a subtractive strategy capable of disrupting the regional balance 
of power at its own detriment. The resulting drive to reaffirm and protect its vital 
interests in the near abroad clashed directly with EU own interests and policies, 
fostering a typical ‘insecurity spiral’ between Russia and its neighbors.
EU-Russian competition in the shared neighbourhood backfired both on 
the overall coherence and credibility of EU policies and on the attempt to 
promote regional stability and economic development. First and foremost, the 
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‘Russian factor’ worked both at the intra-European and intra-Atlantic level in 
affecting EU coherence and their potential for action. On the one hand, the 
farther the competition went, the more diverging views and attitudes vis-à-vis 
Russia surfaced among EU members, which generated a dangerous discrepancy 
between stated goals and concrete actions. The emergence of a ‘Russia first’ 
attitude among some of the most influential EU member states undermined 
the overall credibility of Brussels’ policies. Ukrainian crisis had only a marginal 
impact on this trend. Indeed, while showing an unprecedented degree of unity 
in adopting and renewing economic sanctions against Russia, EU member 
states still manifest diverging views regarding relations with Moscow as well as 
regarding the interests at stake in the eastern neighborhood. Secondly, the high-
est peak of regional competition reached before the Ukrainian crisis – namely 
the 2008 Russo-Georgian War – had a disruptive effect on the ‘Transatlantic 
ticket’. It affected the EU-NATO regional convergence of aims and policies, 
which since the mid-’90s had driven enlargements while consequently ensur-
ing a consistent and comprehensive Euro-Atlantic approach toward the re-
framing of European borders. Though NATO was still committed to engaging 
in and supporting the stability of its EU Southern neighbourhood, the same no 
longer holds true for the eastern one. Declaratory stances apart, it seems clear 
that the August 2008 war crystallized the attempt to extend the Atlantic secu-
rity umbrella to the Southern Caucasus, providing regional actors with security 
guarantees upon which a ‘softer’ European approach may find fertile ground.
The detrimental effects of competition with Russia over EU leverage on the 
‘shared neighbourhood’ did not manifest only at the security level. The EU’s 
effort to pursue closer cooperation with its eastern partners through increased 
political association and economic integration has been accompanied by a simi-
lar attempt carried out by the RF. Building explicitly upon the EU’s experi-
ence (Putin 2011), Moscow reached out to the shared neighbourhood with a 
fresh and alternative proposal for economic integration. The reference goes to 
the EEU, which represented a real innovation in comparison with previous 
regional cooperation initiatives, which were traditionally affected by lack of 
focus, institutionalization and commitment. Thus, besides counting on tradi-
tional tools for exerting influence in the shared neighborhood – i.e. the energy 
leverage and the economic and military strength – the Kremlin began to com-
pete with the EU also on integration terms, introducing an unprecedented 
regional ‘normative rivalry’ (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012, p. 9). Additionally, 
above and beyond EU-Russian normative rivalry, a much more meaningful 
competition seems to have taken shape between their respective institutional 
models. The EU power of attraction is being increasingly challenged by the 
appeal of ‘Putinism’ which, shaped by a mixture of managed democracy and 
corporate capitalism (Appelbaum 2013), contradicts the core values embodied 
by the EU. It may be argued that Putinism is short-sighted in comparison to the 
long-term vision and prospective developmental gains in the policies of the EU. 
Nevertheless, the appeal of Putinism and its power system in a region shaped by 
weak institutionalization, creeping instability and still unfulfilled state building 
processes is self-explanatory.
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Following a ‘more-for-more’ approach, conditionality remains the corner-
stone of the ENP and EaP frameworks with long-term economic liberalization 
as the main incentive for enhancing cooperation. However, the EU’s strategic 
approach to cooperation has increasingly been challenged by the Kremlin’s tac-
tical approach, which emphasizes the short-term benefits of cooperation as well 
as the negative repercussions of dis-alignment. The strength of Moscow’s tacti-
cal approach and the ‘zero-sum game’ logic affecting EU and Russian regional 
projections emerged clearly with respect to Armenia’s decision not to sign the 
AA with the EU at the 2013 EaP Vilinius Summit (notwithstanding the suc-
cessful completion of negotiations) but to join instead the Russian-backed 
Customs Union and therefore, since January 2015, the EEU. Yerevan’s stance 
was the result of a set of intertwined factors and considerations.18 However, the 
main argument put forward by Armenian President Serzh Sarkisian to justify 
the ‘U-turn’ – the impossibility and inefficacy of decoupling economic integra-
tion from military cooperation (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 2013b) – 
shows both the key role played in the Caucasus by the ‘security dilemma’ as well 
as the linked Russian backlash power.
Last but not least, the weakness of the EU regional approach to the Southern 
Caucasus results from the increasing lack of coordination with Turkey, a regional 
‘middle power’ that in the ’90s represented a fundamental anchor for Euro-
Atlantic projection. Paradoxically, such a trend seems to collide with the spirit 
of the EU-Turkey ‘enhanced political dialogue’ and ‘positive agenda’ processes 
as well as with the overall coincidence of regional interests. Indeed, notwith-
standing the high degree of compatibility of respective foreign policy vectors 
and aims, while Turkey’s “positive role of regional stabilisation” in the Caucasus 
was recognized and praised by the 2008 Progress Report (European Commis-
sion 2008, p. 83), little has been done to date to coordinate regional policies. 
The progressive de-securitization of Ankara’s foreign policy and the relevance 
attached to the promotion of economic interdependence in a typical ‘trading 
state’ posture provide Brussels with relevant yet unexploited19 regional tools 
for action. However, Ankara’s partial ‘defection’ from Atlantic alignment and 
simultaneous proposition of ‘regional ownership’ approach to regional coop-
eration resulted, on the one hand, in an unprecedented though contradictory 
entente with Russia and, on the other hand, in a counterproductive detachment 
between Caucasus policies of Turkey and the EU. Moreover, on the backdrop of 
the EU-Ankara tensions which followed the July 2016 failed coup attempt, the 
growing authoritarian posture and rhetoric of the Turkish leadership seem to 
add a new dimension to the regional normative competition in the neighbour-
hood already initiated by Russia.
Conclusions
Despite a growing engagement in the eastern neighbourhood in both eco-
nomic and security terms, the EU’s leverage and influence on the Southern 
Caucasus seems to be vanishing, along with its power of attraction. Not only 
has the EU failed in providing stability, security and well-being to the area, but, 
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at the same time, it has lost much of its credibility as an external anchor for 
regional growth and development.
While the EU’s passive leverage proved to be unsuited to influence partners’ 
behaviour due to the poor homogeneity of national perspectives and interests, 
the conditionality-lite was not sound enough to ensure Brussels an efficient 
active leverage. Therefore, EU regional ambitions were thwarted at both mul-
tilateral and bilateral level by the extreme complexity and fragmentation of the 
region, on the one hand, and by its weakened bargaining power, on the other.
Above all, the regional promotion of EU interests in terms of both a con-
tinuation and preservation of the European integration project was affected 
by the lack of a consistent and comprehensive approach, i.e. by the lack of a 
strategic vision capable of untangling the complex and intertwined Caucasian 
knots. Contrary to the goals of the project, EU policy toward the Southern 
Caucasus was, to a great extent, ‘reactive’. Both in the case of ENP and EaP, 
regional dynamics and events acted as the main trigger for EU action. This was 
the case with the 2004 Georgian ‘Rose revolution’ as well as with the 2008 war 
in South Ossetia. At the same time, EU neighbourhood policy proved to be 
elusive by avoiding involvement in the regional security issues that impinged 
upon the domestic and foreign policies of partner countries. In particular, by 
avoiding tackling the issue of protracted conflicts, the EU marginalizes itself as 
an influential regional political actor and indirectly contributes to the protrac-
tion of a status quo that hampers regional stabilization and consistent develop-
ment while simultaneously strengthening Russian hegemony.
As a reaction to regional events deeply intertwined with regional power 
struggle, EU Caucasus policy ultimately stirred up a geopolitical confronta-
tion with Russia. EU-Russian regional projections have grown increasingly 
confrontational, not only in normative terms, but also in terms of competi-
tion between values and institutional models, significantly raising the interest 
at stake. As the dramatic events taking place in Ukraine show, turning the east-
ern neighbourhood into a ‘normative battleground’ may ultimately affect the 
EU’s overall aim of promoting stability and development beyond its borders. 
Although it appears incorrect to blame the EU for the current tensions with 
Russia over the shared neighbourhood, the ‘security dilemma’ once character-
izing NATO-Russian relations seems now to affect Brussels-Moscow ones. 
Therefore, EU policies risk becoming a trigger for further strategic polariza-
tion in the Southern Caucasus, hampering their own aims and imperilling the 
national interests of its partners.
Neighbourhood policy seems ill equipped to ensure a relevant and influen-
tial role for the EU in the region. Looking at the three Caucasian republics, 
there is an inverse relationship between the countries’ degree of engagement 
with the EU and their relative strength. Georgia, which proved to be the most 
committed to domestic reform and integration with the EU, is simultaneously 
the most vulnerable actor to the regional power-game and to Russian ‘pressure 
points’ (Kapanadze 2014). On the other hand, Azerbaijan, which may be con-
sidered as the most powerful sub-regional state thanks to economic growth and 
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increasing interdependence with European partners, appears to be the least keen 
to cooperation and engagement in following a logic of non- alignment. Finally, 
Armenia seems to be in the middle, walking a delicate tightrope between the 
willingness to enhance its cooperation with the EU and the commitment to 
the alliance with Russia, which remains a strategic priority. Against this back-
drop, the signing of AA with Georgia, though marking a relevant success for 
Brussels’ regional policy, cannot be seen as a decisive step either toward the 
stabilization of the area or toward the coherent and sustainable engagement 
of Georgia. Simultaneously, negotiations currently undergoing with Armenia 
and Azerbaijan with a view to conclude new comprehensive agreements seem 
to demonstrate EU regional difficulties rather than its potential for improving 
Caucasus’ stability and development. Indeed, while the EU-Armenia agree-
ment is naturally limited in scope by virtue of Yerevan’s participation in the 
EEU, the EU-Azerbaijan one is unlikely to reach far beyond the provisions of 
the PCAs in force since 1999. Although the limited scope of these agreements 
results from the more tailored approach to bilateral cooperation endorsed by 
the 2015 ENP Revision, nonetheless it seems to reflect the enduring EU dif-
ficulty in balancing its own values and interests, as well as in identifying ‘shared 
interests’ capable of enhancing regional stability, growth and democratization.
The Southern Caucasus poses a key challenge to EU policymakers. It calls 
on them to provide sound perspectives for stability and development in an 
uncertain and conflictual scenario while re-inventing a ‘carrot and stick’ scheme 
capable of compensating for the progressive vanishing of asymmetry in bilat-
eral relations. Without a fresh compensation component of its conditionality, 
the attempts to trigger reform and to influence partners’ behaviour may prove 
fruitless. In turn, this could affect the continuation and preservation of the 
European integration project.
Notes
 1 The linkage between external and internal dimensions of security as well as between 
good-governance in the neighbourhood and EU security has been reiterated, since then, 
by all documents following up the 2003 ESS. See, for instance, Council of the Euro-
pean Union, Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – providing secu-
rity in a changing world, S407/08, Brussels, December 11, 2008; European Commission 
(2010), The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps towards a More Secure Europe, 
COM(2010) 673 final, Brussels, November 22.
 2 For a critical view on the double security narrative – normative/duty versus threat/
risk – inscribed in EU projection toward the Eastern neighbourhood, see Christou, G. 
(2010) ‘European Union Security Logics to the East: the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and the Eastern Partnership’, European Security, 19, 3.
 3 In a footnote of the 2003 Communication on ‘Wider Europe’, the Commission speci-
fied that: ‘Given their location, the Southern Caucasus [. . .] fall outside the geographical 
scope of this initiative for the time being’ (European Commission 2003, p. 4).
 4 In contrast to the exclusion from the ENP, the decision to appoint a Special Representa-
tive for the Caucasus testified to the growing relevance of the region to the EU and, as 
Lynch put it, ‘the recognition by the member states that their individual policies to the 
region have had limited impact, and that an EU umbrella would bring value-added’. 
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Lynch, D. (2004) ‘Security Sector Governance in the Southern Caucasus-Towards an 
EU Strategy’, in Ebnother A. and Gustenau G. (eds.) (2004), Security Sector Governance in 
Southern Caucasus – Challenges and Visions (Vienna, National Defence Academy), p. 45.
 5 Highlighting the lack of consensus among European institutions regarding the policy 
toward the Southern Caucasus, in February 2004 it was the European Parliament’s turn 
to recommend providing the region with a defined status in the new neighbourhood 
policy in accordance with the principle of avoiding the creation of new dividing lines 
in Europe and to stimulate the countries in the region to advance in political and eco-
nomic reforms. See, European Parliament (2004) European Parliament resolution with a 
European Parliament recommendation to the Council on EU policy towards the South Caucasus, 
P5_TA (2004)0122, Brussels, February 26.
 6 The need to engage Caspian region producing states was highlighted in May 2003 by 
the Commission, listing the area among those with which the EU was called upon to 
cooperate in order to: (a) face the challenges of growing external energy dependence, 
(b) address infrastructure issues, (c) diversify sources of energy geographically and tech-
nologically and (d) broaden the basis for energy trade. Commission of the European 
Communities (2003), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on the development of energy policy for the enlarged European Union, neighbours and 
partner countries, COM (2003)262 final, Brussels, May 26, pp. 4–5.
 7 According to the 2004 ENP Strategy Paper, “The privileged relationship with neigh-
bours will build on mutual commitment to common values principally within the fields 
of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human rights, including minor-
ity rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and the principles of market 
economy and sustainable development”. (European Commission 2004, p. 3).
 8 The 2015 ENP Review explicitly reaffirmed the linkage stating that ‘the EU’s own sta-
bility is built on democracy, human rights and the rule of law and economic openness’ 
(European Commission 2015b, p. 2).
 9 Multilateral platforms envisioned for 2014–2017 are democracy, good governance and 
stability; economic integration and convergence with EU policies; energy security; and 
contacts between people.
 10 To date, the EU signed a MP with all Caucasian Republics – Georgia in 2009, Armenia 
in 2011 and Azerbaijan in 2013. Visa facilitation and readmission agreements entered 
into force in the three Republics between 2011 and 2014. Finally, since 2012 negotia-
tions are undergoing between EU and Georgia for the conclusion of a visa liberalization 
agreement.
 11 After brokering the ceasefire between Russia and Georgia, the EU undertook a leading 
role in both peace negotiations and post-conflict rehabilitation. In September 2008, the 
EU established a Special Representative for the crisis in Georgia – a position combined 
in 2011 with the Special Representative for Southern Caucasus. Since 2008, the latter 
co-chairs the Geneva International Discussions on the Conflict in Georgia along with 
the UN and OSCE. In the wake of the war, it also deployed a civilian mission (the EU 
Monitoring Mission, EUMM) with a mandate to monitor parties’ compliance with the 
ceasefire agreement. Following the termination of the security arrangements launched 
in Georgia under the aegis of the UN and OSCE, EUMM became the main external 
security provider in the country.
 12 In 2014, EU share of total imports in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia was, respectively, 
24.2%, 33.8% and 27.6%, while the share of total exports was, respectively, 29.3%, 53.2% 
and 21.8%. European Commission, Eurostat Database, available from: http://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/data/database (Accessed: 15 May 2017).
 13 In order to strengthen the incentive based approach, the Eastern Partnership Integra-
tion and Cooperation (EAPIC) programme was launched in 2012 to fast-track funds 
and provide additional financial assistance as a reward for progress in democratization 
and respect for human rights. Under the programme, in 2012 and 2013, a total of € 
49 million were mobilised as extra resources for Georgia and another € 40 million for 
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Armenia. European Commission (2014) Implementation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy –  Statistical Annex, SWD (2014)98 final, Brussels, March 27, p. 46–54.
 14 Interestingly, according to Leila Alieva the ‘double endorsement’ was apparently the 
result of the EU failure in putting forward a formula for compromise able to accommo-
date both partners’ perspectives and desiderata. Alieva, L. (2006) EU and South Caucasus, 
CAP Discussion Paper (Munich: Center for Applied Policy Research), p. 12.
 15 The ‘return to Europe’ vision in CEE countries was supported by a sense of historical 
payback, based on the assumption that the West bore the responsibility for their inclusion 
in the Soviet block in the post-War period. Dunay, P. (2004) ‘Strategy with fast-moving 
targets: East-Central Europe’, in Dannreuther R. (ed.), pp. 35–36.
 16 Azerbaijan seems to be a good case in point. Indeed, the development of a ‘balanced 
foreign policy’ proceeded together with the self-representation of a country ‘at the cross-
roads of the West and East’ embracing ‘elements of various civilizations’ – from the 
‘European values’ to the ‘heritage and spiritual values of the Islamic civilization’. See 
National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, May 23, 2007, p. 3. Available 
at: www.azembassy.org.au/uploads/docs/Azerbaijan.pdf (Accessed: 10 December 2014).
 17 The geopolitical dimension of the competition and its increasingly confrontational tone 
are best epitomized by the harsh rhetoric employed by Russian leadership towards the 
EaP since its inception. See e.g. Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov’s reference to the 
EU attempt to expand its ‘sphere of influence ‘in EuObserver, March 21, 2009.
 18 For the domestic and regional factors leading to Armenian refusal to sign the AA with the 
EU, see Khachatrian, H. (2013) ‘Armenia Faces Tough Decision over Association Agree-
ment’, CACI Analyst, August 22; Giragosian, R. (2014) Armenia’s Strategic U-Turn, 
ECFR policy memo, April 22 (Brussels, European Council on Foreign Relations).
 19 The EU, for instance, took a back seat position in the 2008–2009 process aimed at the 
normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations that strictly intertwined with the main 
Caucasus security knot and could have brought a real step change to regional coop-
eration. However, it watched from a distance the failure of an ill-conceived initiative 
that, instead of breaking the vicious circle of Caucasus polarization, contributed to its 
strengthening.
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